The geopolitical landscape surrounding the conflict between the United States and Iran has undergone a fundamental transformation since hostilities began on February 28. Recent reports from Iranian authorities indicate that seven oil tankers have been damaged or set ablaze in the vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has issued stark warnings that any further US-led aggression could trigger a broader regional response, even as international markets react to the heightened instability.
While military analysts suggest a major US offensive is unlikely before the November 3 midterm elections, the persistent posturing from both sides has increased concerns that escalatory rhetoric may lead to renewed strikes. The conflict, which initially aimed to topple the Iranian leadership and neutralize regional allies like Hamas and Hezbollah, has now directly threatened the stability of the Strait of Hormuz—a crucial maritime corridor that previously facilitated the transit of one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas. Sabre-rattling on both sides has raised fears that escalating rhetoric could give way to renewed attacks with control of the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian nuclear facilities at the heart of the conflict, although analysts consider a US attack before the November 3 midterm elections unlikely. How does the land lie now before potential renewed strikes and how does it differ from February before any of this began, as the US wrestles with depleted defensive weapons stocks and a global energy crisis mounts. Announcing the offensive, Trump pledged to prevent Tehran-backed groups from attacking US forces and destabilising the region. Iran continues to threaten and attack shipping there while the US maintains its own blockade of Iranian ports. Traffic has been severely disrupted and supplies of oil and gas have been sharply reduced. Insisting the military had planned for that possibility, defence Secretary Pete Hegseth rejected the reporting. Which faces midterm elections in less than two weeks, iran’s rulers remain concerned about unrest and their own survival but do not face the same electoral reckoning as Trump’s Republican Party. Weighed down by sanctions and assets frozen abroad, iran’s economy was already struggling before the war.
The geographical reach of the fighting has widened significantly. Unlike the conditions present in February, the conflict now spans multiple fronts. Although the offensive has failed to induce a change in the Iranian government, it has severely weakened Hamas, with over 1,400 Palestinians killed since the conflict escalated. Meanwhile, the killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and security chief Ali Larijani in initial air strikes prompted retaliatory action from Hezbollah, effectively pulling Lebanon into the fray and resulting in an Israeli bombing campaign against identified strongholds in southern Lebanon and Beirut. At one point, occupied about one-fifth of the country, displacing more than one million people, israel launched a bombing campaign against sites in southern Lebanon and the suburbs of Beirut it considers Hezbollah strongholds and. US-Israeli attacks subsequently killed Khamenei, who had ruled since 1989, and security chief Ali Larijani. According to it, Continued operations were expected to cost about $2bn to $3bn a month, depending on the intensity of fighting.
Energy infrastructure has emerged as a primary battleground. Urban Coningham, a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, noted that while the Gulf has endured previous attacks, the current scale and velocity of Iranian strikes against oil and gas facilities represent a significant shift. Tehran is now leveraging its position along the Strait of Hormuz to impose strategic costs on the international community, a reality that the Pentagon and US National Security Council reportedly underestimated in early spring. However, has been the emergence of the Gulf’s waterways and energy infrastructure as key targets, the biggest geographical change. Iranian attacks on US military assets and civilian infrastructure have exposed Gulf countries to the consequences of a war they had hoped to avoid.
The situation in Yemen has further complicated regional security. Renewed fighting between the Saudi-backed government and the Iran-aligned Houthi movement has focused attention on the Bab al-Mandeb strait. Houthi threats against this critical trade chokepoint, which links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, have added yet another layer to the expanding regional front. Undermine efforts to move Gulf exports through alternative routes and place additional pressure on the US, houthi threats against Saudi-linked shipping there could compound transportation disruptions in Hormuz.
Political calculations have shifted on both sides.
Domestically, Iran’s leadership, now under Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, continues to face challenges from hardliners within the IRGC. Khamenei’s son Mojtaba succeeded him.
While the conflict has fostered a rallying effect centered on resistance to foreign intervention, experts warn this does not necessarily equate to strengthened government stability.
Conversely, political pressure on US leadership has intensified as the war continues; President Trump’s approval rating dropped from 40 percent just before the conflict to 31 percent in a recent survey, the lowest recorded during his time in office, amid public frustration regarding the war’s economic impact. According to his approval rating has fallen from 40 percent in a Reuters/Ipsos poll, Days before the war began to just 31 percent in a survey released on Monday – the lowest recorded by the pollster across either of Trump’s p. Seeking to isolate Iran from international trade by imposing penalties on those doing business with it, the pressure intensified in late August when Washington launched Operation Economic Outcast.
The economic toll has been severe. Iran’s government estimated that US-Israeli strikes resulted in $270 billion in direct and indirect damages by April. Official figures indicate a 10.1 percent year-on-year contraction in Iran’s GDP for the second quarter. The US has also faced mounting fiscal burdens; the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the conflict had cost the Department of Defense $38 billion by August 1. These expenditures have contributed to US government debt surpassing a record $40 trillion in August, two years ahead of previous projections. Official figures showed Iran’s gross domestic product contracted by 10.1 percent year-on-year from March 21 to June 20.
Global energy markets remain volatile. Brent crude, which traded at $72.48 a barrel on February 27, surged to a four-year high of $126.41 by April 30. Despite slight fluctuations, prices remained high at $114.47 by mid-October. The International Energy Agency has cautioned that supply constraints resulting from the conflict could persist well into 2027.
Militarily, the IRGC has displayed resilience by utilizing decentralized command structures and mass-produced, cost-effective drones to counter superior US military technology. While Washington has proven its capability to conduct deep strikes within Iranian territory, this has yet to result in the collapse of the Iranian political system or the total suppression of regional proxies. As Coningham observed, the central challenge for Washington remains the difficulty of translating its clear military superiority into long-term, favorable strategic outcomes.
