Bringing together Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan—countries with substantial military, economic, and strategic influence—the Mecca Agreement has sparked a significant debate among analysts regarding its potential to evolve into a more expansive security architecture. This trilateral pact signals a growing regional desire to manage security affairs with greater autonomy, moving away from traditional reliance on external powers.
Analysts say the agreement represents a broader shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics. Rather than targeting a specific adversary, it seeks to establish a flexible defence framework that allows member states to navigate complex regional dynamics. “It names no adversary, and Ankara has been deliberate about saying so,” Oral Toga, an expert at the Center for Iranian Studies, an Ankara-based think tank, tells.
“That omission is the design choice that makes everything else possible, because it lets each signatory keep its existing relationships intact.” This strategic ambiguity is central to the pact’s appeal, allowing members to avoid the binary choices often forced by global powers. The agreement also reflects a broader reassessment of regional security following the recent Iran-US confrontation and the resulting instability, which underscored the limits of relying on external actors for long-term security.
The regional response has so far reflected the agreement’s flexible design. While some states have welcomed the initiative, others remain cautious, observing how the framework will function in practice. In this context, it is perceived that the Mecca Agreement gives the impression of a flexible platform open to actors sharing a common vision of stability, rather than an exclusionary structure, Korpe tells.
Ozgur Korpe, an academic at Türkiye’s National Defence University and a military analyst, argues that the agreement’s flexibility is precisely what makes it attractive to countries that may wish to join later. “Broad security complexes like the Middle East contain ‘sub-complexes’ within themselves, such as the Gulf or the Levant. It is anticipated that potential participation will occur in a cautious and gradual manner, in accordance with each state’s own sub-regional threat perceptions and security interdependencies.”
Analysts note that some regional powers must carefully balance a range of existing security and diplomatic partnerships before committing to new, potentially binding, arrangements. “Joining means accepting a commitment that could be invoked by someone else’s crisis, and states with dense relationships on multiple sides will weigh that carefully,” Toga says, referring to countries such as Egypt and several Gulf states.
The agreement’s flexible design has also prompted questions about whether the three founding members intend to expand the membership. Analysts believe the answer is yes, with expansion likely to take shape as the agreement’s institutional framework develops. The prospect of expansion comes as the three founding members begin establishing the agreement’s institutional structure, while Turkish officials say other countries have already expressed interest in joining.
Saira Bano, an assistant professor of politics at Thompson Rivers University in Canada, says the agreement is better understood as “an emerging mechanism of regional strategic coordination” than as a NATO-style military alliance. “However, Gulf and Middle Eastern states have different threat perceptions and different relationships with Iran, Israel and the United States,” she says, adding that this will make “the creation of a unified regional military bloc difficult” in the short term.
Toga shares that assessment, arguing that the agreement’s architects envision “selective growth rather than a wave.” He notes that “President Erdogan’s stated vision is a broader structure rather than a permanent trio.” While the agreement contains a collective security principle similar to NATO’s Article 5, it should not be seen as a Middle Eastern version of the alliance. “The agreement contains an Article 5-like principle according to which aggression against one member is treated as aggression against the others.”
The perception is clear that this kind of alliance is a message to both Iran and Israel. “Israel has its own concern, which already made it clear that they are worried of any kind of alliance between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan.” Despite these tensions, the treaty’s ultimate goal is described as internalising the regional security architecture rather than purely deterring external actors.
While Iran’s constitution prohibits military alliances, analysts suggest that Iran could potentially be a candidate for joining this treaty in the future, depending on how the regional landscape evolves. The ongoing development of the agreement suggests that the founding members are prioritizing a slow, deliberate expansion that minimizes friction with existing regional players.
As the institutional framework matures, the Mecca Agreement will likely serve as a litmus test for the feasibility of indigenous security cooperation in the Middle East. Whether it can successfully navigate the competing interests of its potential members remains the central question for regional observers and policymakers alike.
“Restoring deterrence is the most important objective of the pact, after the war started on 28 February.
Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar have welcomed the initiative, while Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have yet to publicly endorse it.
The Gulf state has maintained working relations with Iran while simultaneously serving as a key US security partner and an important mediator between Washington and Tehran.
“Expansion is possible, but I would not expect a rapid enlargement into a large formal alliance.
But she cautions that differing security priorities across the region will make rapid expansion difficult.
“Therefore, we may see other countries cooperating with the three states in particular areas such as intelligence sharing, military exercises, maritime security, counterterrorism or defence technology without necessarily becoming full members of the agreement.”
But the deal also aims to enhance strategic diversification, combining the different capabilities each of the three have, with the aim of reducing dependence from the US,” Zaccara tells.
But it doesn’t mean states are forced to respond automatically to the aggressor.
Although the pact emerged in the aftermath of the Iran-US confrontation, analysts caution against viewing it solely through the prism of Tehran.
Rather than describing the agreement as a threat, Tehran has portrayed it as part of a broader effort to strengthen a regional security order less dependent on outside powers.
That interpretation is shared by Mohammed Eslami, a political scientist at the European University Institute.
“The agreement could represent an early step towards a more autonomous security architecture among influential Muslim majority states.
“If additional states eventually participate and the agreement develops permanent institutions, regular military consultations, joint exercises and clearer mutual defence obligations, then comparisons with a collective security alliance would become more appropriate.”
